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AI Case Study

LLM Jacking - AI Case Study

The Sysdig Threat Research Team discovered that malicious actors utilized stolen credentials to gain access to cloud-hosted large language models (LLMs). The actors covertly gathered information about which models were enabled on the cloud service and created a reverse proxy for LLMs that would allow them to provide model access to cybercriminals. The Sysdig researchers identified tools used by the unknown actors...

IncidentCloud-Based LLM ServicesUnknownResource DevelopmentInitial AccessCredential Access

Overview

Case steps7Steps described in the case record.
Techniques6Attack methods mentioned in the case steps.
Linked CVEs1Known vulnerabilities mentioned in the record.

Risk patterns

Patterns found in the case record and its linked vulnerabilities.

  • 1Dominant ATLAS tactic. Resource Development appears in 2 case steps.
  • 2Multiple attack methods. The case connects to 6 unique AI attack methods.
  • 3Vulnerability mentions. The record connects 1 vulnerability identifiers to this case.

Procedure timeline

Search the case steps or filter them by attacker goal.

Resource Development2Initial Access1Credential Access1Privilege Escalation1Discovery1Impact1
  1. Privilege Escalation

    The compromised credentials gave the adversaries access to cloud environments where large language model (LLM) services were hosted.

  2. Resource Development

    The adversaries obtained keychecker, a bulk key checker for various AI services which is capable of testing if the key is valid and retrieving some attributes of the account (e.g. account balance and available models).

  3. Discovery

    The adversaries used keychecker to discover which LLM services were enabled in the cloud environment and if the resources had any resource quotas for the services. Then, the adversaries checked to see if their stolen credentials gave them access to the LLM resources. They used legitimate invokeModel queries with an invalid value of -1 for the max_tokens_to_sample parameter, which would raise an AccessDenied error if the credentials did not have the proper access to invoke the model. This test revealed that the stolen credentials did provide them with access to LLM resources. The adversaries also used GetModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration to understand how the model was configured. This allowed them to see if prompt logging was enabled to help them avoid detection when executing prompts.

  4. Resource Development

    The adversaries then used OAI Reverse Proxy to create a reverse proxy service in front of the stolen LLM resources. The reverse proxy service could be used to sell access to cybercriminals who could exploit the LLMs for malicious purposes.

  5. Impact

    In addition to providing cybercriminals with covert access to LLM resources, the unauthorized use of these LLM models could cost victims thousands of dollars per day.

Mitigations

Defenses connected to the attack methods in this case.

No connected defenses found for this case. Built from the attack methods identified in the case record.

Sources

Original public records and references for this case.

Original source

Original source links

Open the MITRE ATLAS data and public references used for this case study.