Record summary
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Attack context
How this AI attack works in practice.
Adversaries may publish legitimate AI components or software, gain user adoption, then push an update with a malicious variant, leading to AI Supply Chain Compromise. More scrutiny is often placed on a supply chain dependency when it is first being considered for inclusion in an AI system. Performing a rug pull may allow adversaries to bypass these defenses and be more likely to achieve Initial Access.
Adversaries may publish malicious AI components via Publish Poisoned Models, Publish Poisoned Datasets, or Publish Poisoned AI Agent Tool.
Adversaries may use other techniques (See AI Supply Chain Reputation Inflation) to gain user trust and increase adoption before performing the rug pull.
- ATLAS ID
- AML.T0109
- Priority score
- 100
Mitigations
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Case studies
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Poisoned Postmark MCP Server Email Exfiltration
A bad actor successfully exfiltrated emails from users of the Postmark’s MCP server via a supply chain attack. Postmark is an email delivery service that allows organizations to send marketing and transactional emails via API. The Postmark MCP server allows users to interact with Postmark via AI agents.
The bad actor impersonated Postmark, by registering the postmark-mcp package name on npm. They initially published the legitimate versions of the MCP server. After the package became popular and reached over 1,000 downloads per week, the bad actor performed a rugpull and uploaded a malicious version of the package. The malicious version added the bad actor’s email address in the BCC line of all emails sent by the MCP tool. Users who upgraded to this version and continued to use the tool would have all emails exfiltrated to the bad actor.
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