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CVE-2026-42208 - BerriAI LiteLLM

AI Vulnerability Context

LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.81.16 to before version 1.83.7, a database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/comple...

Overview

A source-backed snapshot of this vulnerability.

LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.81.16 to before version 1.83.7, a database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.

CISA KEVyesWhether CISA lists this as exploited.
Techniques0AI attack methods connected to this vulnerability.
Case studies0Examples where this vulnerability is mentioned.

Vulnerability status

How serious this vulnerability is and whether it is known to be exploited.

CISA KEVCRITICAL
CVE ID
CVE-2026-42208
Vendor/project
BerriAI
Product
LiteLLM
Vulnerability name
BerriAI LiteLLM SQL Injection Vulnerability
Date added
2026-05-08
Due date
2026-05-11
Known ransomware campaign use
Unknown
CVSS v3
9.8
CVSS v4
9.3
CWE-89

Exploit context

What the vulnerability is about.

LiteLLM is a proxy server (AI Gateway) to call LLM APIs in OpenAI (or native) format. From version 1.81.16 to before version 1.83.7, a database query used during proxy API key checks mixed the caller-supplied key value into the query text instead of passing it as a separate parameter. An unauthenticated attacker could send a specially crafted Authorization header to any LLM API route (for example POST /chat/completions) and reach this query through the proxy's error-handling path. An attacker could read data from the proxy's database and may be able to modify it, leading to unauthorised access to the proxy and the credentials it manages. This issue has been patched in version 1.83.7.

Source evidence

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Original source

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