Dual use science risks
AI Risk"General- purpose AI systems could accelerate advances in a range of scientific endeavours, from training new scientists to enabling faster research workflows. While these capabilities could have numerous beneficial applications, some experts have expressed concern that they could be used for malicious purposes, especially if further capabilities are developed soon before appropriate countermeasures are put in pla...
Overview
A source-backed snapshot of this AI risk.
"General- purpose AI systems could accelerate advances in a range of scientific endeavours, from training new scientists to enabling faster research workflows. While these capabilities could have numerous beneficial applications, some experts have expressed concern that they could be used for malicious purposes, especially if further capabilities are developed soon before appropriate countermeasures are put in place. There are two avenues by which general- purpose AI systems could, speculatively, facilitate malicious use in the life sciences: firstly by providing increased access to information and expertise relevant to malicious use, and secondly by increasing the ceiling of capabilities, which may enable the development of more harmful versions of existing threats or, eventually, lead to novel threats (404, 405)."
Risk profile
How the MIT AI Risk Repository categorizes this risk.
Merged risk records
Source records unified into this canonical risk concept.
MITRISK-Bengio2024-49.01.03 - Dual use science risks
"General- purpose AI systems could accelerate advances in a range of scientific endeavours, from training new scientists to enabling faster research workflows. While these capabilities could have numerous beneficial applications, some experts have expressed concern that they could be used for malicious purposes, especially if further capabilities are developed soon before appropriate countermeasures are put in place. There are two avenues by which general- purpose AI systems could, speculatively, facilitate malicious use in the life sciences: firstly by providing increased access to information and expertise relevant to malicious use, and secondly by increasing the ceiling of capabilities, which may enable the development of more harmful versions of existing threats or, eventually, lead to novel threats (404, 405)."
MITRISK-DSIT2023-67.03.01 - Dual Use Science risks
"Frontier AI systems have the potential to accelerate advances in the life sciences, from training new scientists to enabling faster scientific workflows. While these capabilities will have tremendous beneficial applications, there is a risk that they can be used for malicious purposes, such as for the development of biological or chemical weapons."
MITRISK-DSIT2023-67.03.01a - Dual Use Science risks
"Frontier AI systems have the potential to accelerate advances in the life sciences, from training new scientists to enabling faster scientific workflows. While these capabilities will have tremendous beneficial applications, there is a risk that they can be used for malicious purposes, such as for the development of biological or chemical weapons."
MITRISK-DSIT2023-67.03.01b - Dual Use Science risks
"Frontier AI systems have the potential to accelerate advances in the life sciences, from training new scientists to enabling faster scientific workflows. While these capabilities will have tremendous beneficial applications, there is a risk that they can be used for malicious purposes, such as for the development of biological or chemical weapons."
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Mitigations
Defenses that may help with related attacks.
Source evidence
Research source for this risk, when available.
Included resource
International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI
Original source
MIT AI Risk Repository
Open the public repository used for AI risk records and taxonomy fields.
