Record summary
A quick snapshot of what this page covers.
Risk profile
How this risk is described and categorized.
"A foremost lesson of game theory is that optimal decision-making within a single-agent setting (i.e. selfishly optimizing for an agent’s own utility) can produce sub-optimal outcomes in the presence of other strategic agents. Failing to account for the strategic nature of other agents can cause an agent to adopt strategies under which potentially everyone, including the agent itself, ends up worse off (Schelling, 1981; Harsanyi, 1995; Roughgarden, 2005; Nisan, 2007). Examples include collective action problems (or ‘social dilemmas’) such as arms races or the depletion of common resources, as well as other kinds of market failures such as those caused by asymmetric information or negative externalities (Bator, 1958; Coase, 1960; Buchanan and Stubblebine, 1962; Kirzner, 1963; Dubey, 1986)."
Suggested mitigations
Defenses that may help with related attacks.
Source
Research source for this risk, when available.
Included resource
Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models
Original source
MIT AI Risk Repository
Open the public repository used for AI risk records and taxonomy fields.