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Nascent capabilities (emergent capabilities)

AI Risk

Example: "Power seeking behaviours: Although this point is still the subject of much research and debate, AI systems tasked with ambitious objectives and minimal oversight may exhibit an increased propensity to pursue power. Some studies show a tendency toward power-seeking behaviors,447 which could be explained by the fact that generative AI models try to gain control over the environment and other actors to reac...

Overview

A source-backed snapshot of this AI risk.

Example: "Power seeking behaviours: Although this point is still the subject of much research and debate, AI systems tasked with ambitious objectives and minimal oversight may exhibit an increased propensity to pursue power. Some studies show a tendency toward power-seeking behaviors,447 which could be explained by the fact that generative AI models try to gain control over the environment and other actors to reach their goals. For instance, researchers at Anthropic have conducted experiments to assess their models’ “desire for power,” “desire for wealth,” and “willingness to coordinate with other AIs.”"

Techniques0Attack methods connected to this risk.
Mitigations0Defenses that may help with related attacks.
Records5Source records unified into this concept.

Risk profile

How the MIT AI Risk Repository categorizes this risk.

Domain7. AI System Safety, Failures, & Limitations
Subdomain7.2 > AI possessing dangerous capabilities
Entity2 - AI
Intent1 - Intentional
Timing3 - Other
CategoryEthical and social risks
SubcategoryNascent capabilities (emergent capabilities)

Merged risk records

Source records unified into this canonical risk concept.

5 recordsView all →

MITRISK-G-sell2024-47.02.15.c - Nascent capabilities (emergent capabilities)

Example: "Power seeking behaviours: Although this point is still the subject of much research and debate, AI systems tasked with ambitious objectives and minimal oversight may exhibit an increased propensity to pursue power. Some studies show a tendency toward power-seeking behaviors,447 which could be explained by the fact that generative AI models try to gain control over the environment and other actors to reach their goals. For instance, researchers at Anthropic have conducted experiments to assess their models’ “desire for power,” “desire for wealth,” and “willingness to coordinate with other AIs.”"

SourceRegulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AIYear2024

MITRISK-G-sell2024-47.02.15 - Nascent capabilities (emergent capabilities)

"As large models undergo scaling, they meet critical thresholds at which they spontaneously develop new capabilities. The term “emergent behavior” refers to the unexpected or surprising outputs such models can generate. Some of these new skills are definitely high risk, such as models’ ability to deceive, use their own strategies, seek power, autonomously replicate, and adapt or “self-exfiltrate.”"

Domain7. AI System Safety, Failures, & LimitationsSubdomain7.2 > AI possessing dangerous capabilitiesSourceRegulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AIYear2024

MITRISK-G-sell2024-47.02.15.a - Nascent capabilities (emergent capabilities)

Example: "Deception: Park et al. have established that generative AI models may pursue their goals via deception. Another study by Pan et al. highlighted unethical behaviors.431 For instance, during a pre-release experiment, the GPT-4 model feigned being a visually impaired human to coax an online worker into solving a CAPTCHA (a puzzle used by many websites to weed out automated responses from those of individual humans). When prompted to explain its reasoning, the model said: “I should not reveal that I am a robot. I should invent an excuse for why I cannot solve CAPTCHAs.”

SourceRegulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AIYear2024

MITRISK-G-sell2024-47.02.15.b - Nascent capabilities (emergent capabilities)

Example: "Strategic planning: Generative AI models have the ability to formulate and implement strategies to achieve the objectives set by their developers or users.440 They may devise strategies to accomplish intermediate goals that can divert from the developer’s intentions and the intended outcome.441 As a result, they may use unexpected and possibly harmful methods to achieve a goal"

SourceRegulating under Uncertainty: Governance Options for Generative AIYear2024

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Mitigations

Defenses that may help with related attacks.

No propagated mitigations. No defense is available through the connected attack methods.

Source evidence

Research source for this risk, when available.