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AI Case Study

Organization Confusion on Hugging Face - AI Case Study

threlfall_hax, a security researcher, created organization accounts on Hugging Face, a public model repository, that impersonated real organizations. These false Hugging Face organization accounts looked legitimate so individuals from the impersonated organizations requested to join, believing the accounts to be an official site for employees to share models. This gave the researche...

ExerciseHugging Face usersthrelfall_haxResource DevelopmentDefense EvasionImpact

Overview

Case steps16Steps described in the case record.
Techniques16Attack methods mentioned in the case steps.
Linked CVEs0Known vulnerabilities mentioned in the record.

Risk patterns

Patterns found in the case record and its linked vulnerabilities.

  • 1Dominant ATLAS tactic. Resource Development appears in 3 case steps.
  • 2Multiple attack methods. The case connects to 16 unique AI attack methods.

Procedure timeline

Search the case steps or filter them by attacker goal.

Resource Development3Defense Evasion2Impact2AI Attack Staging2AI Model Access1Initial Access1Execution1Command and Control1Credential Access1Exfiltration1Discovery1
  1. Defense Evasion

    Employees of the targeted company found and joined the fake Hugging Face organization. Since the organization account name is matches or appears to match the real organization, the employees were fooled into believing the account was official.

  2. AI Model Access

    The employees made use of the Hugging Face organizaion and uploaded private models. As owner of the Hugging Face account, the researcher has full read and write access to all of these uploaded models.

  3. AI Attack Staging

    The researcher embedded Sliver, an open source C2 server, into the target model. They added a Lambda layer to the model, which allows for arbitrary code to be run, and used an exec() call to execute the Sliver payload.

  4. Step 7

    Model

    Initial Access

    The victim's AI model supply chain is now compromised. Users of the model repository will receive the adversary's model with embedded malware.

  5. Defense Evasion

    The researcher named the Sliver process training.bin to disguise it as a legitimate model training process. Furthermore, the model still operates as normal, making it less likely a user will notice something is wrong.

  6. Command and Control

    The Sliver implant grants the researcher a command and control channel so they can explore the victim's environment and continue the attack.

  7. Impact

    If the company's models were manipulated to produce false information, a variety of harms including financial and reputational could occur.

Mitigations

Defenses connected to the attack methods in this case.

Sources

Original public records and references for this case.

Original source

Original source links

Open the MITRE ATLAS data and public references used for this case study.