Full AI Model Access - AI Security Technique
AI Security TechniqueAdversaries may gain full "white-box" access to an AI model. This means the adversary has complete knowledge of the model architecture, its parameters, and class ontology. They may exfiltrate the model to Craft Adversarial Data and Verify Attack in an offline where it is hard to detect their behavior.
Overview
A source-backed snapshot of this AI security technique.
Technique details
Identifiers, maturity, and source taxonomy for this technique.
- ATLAS ID
- AML.T0044
- Maturity
- demonstrated
- Priority score
- 86
Attack flow
How to read the public records connected to this technique.
Impact
Why this technique may deserve attention in the current dataset.
- Evidence leveldemonstrated
- Mapped defenses2 ATLAS mitigation records
- Public examples3 linked case study records
- Research risks6 related MIT AI Risk records above the confidence threshold
- Vulnerabilities0 linked CVE records
Mitigations
Defenses that may help against this attack.
AML.M0017 - AI Model Distribution Methods
Not distributing the model in software to edge devices, can limit an adversary's ability to gain full access to the model.
AML.M0005 - Control Access to AI Models and Data at Rest
Access controls on models and data at rest can help prevent full model access.
Case studies
Examples from public reports and exercises.
AI Model Tampering via Supply Chain Attack
Researchers at Trend Micro, Inc. used service indexing portals and web searching tools to identify over 8,000 misconfigured private container registries exposed on the internet. Approximately 70% of the registries also had overly permissive access controls that allowed write access. In their analysis, the researchers found over 1,000 unique AI models embedded in private container images within these open registries that could be pulled without authentication.
This exposure could allow adversaries to download, inspect, and modify container contents, including sensitive AI model files. This is an exposure of valuable intellectual property which could be stolen by an adversary. Compromised images could also be pushed to the registry, leading to a supply chain attack, allowing malicious actors to compromise the integrity of AI models used in production systems.
Organization Confusion on Hugging Face
threlfall_hax, a security researcher, created organization accounts on Hugging Face, a public model repository, that impersonated real organizations. These false Hugging Face organization accounts looked legitimate so individuals from the impersonated organizations requested to join, believing the accounts to be an official site for employees to share models. This gave the researcher full access to any AI models uploaded by the employees, including the ability to replace models with malicious versions. The researcher demonstrated that they could embed malware into an AI model that provided them access to the victim organization's environment. From there, threat actors could execute a range of damaging attacks such as intellectual property theft or poisoning other AI models within the victim's environment.
Backdoor Attack on Deep Learning Models in Mobile Apps
Deep learning models are increasingly used in mobile applications as critical components. Researchers from Microsoft Research demonstrated that many deep learning models deployed in mobile apps are vulnerable to backdoor attacks via "neural payload injection." They conducted an empirical study on real-world mobile deep learning apps collected from Google Play. They identified 54 apps that were vulnerable to attack, including popular security and safety critical applications used for cash recognition, parental control, face authentication, and financial services.
Source evidence
Original public records and references for this page.
Original source
Original source links
Open the public records and source datasets used for this page.
